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Built on Sand: Egypt’s Questionable 
Strategy for Growth and Development 
Stephan Roll and Matthias Sailer 
The Egypt Economic Development Conference staged at the Red Sea resort of Sharm 
el-Sheikh from 13 to 15 March will showcase the country’s investment potential. Cairo 
hopes to prove it has started a turnaround after four years of political and economic 
turmoil. In fact a recovery is not even on the horizon. Foreign capital will be crucial for 
the mega-projects the Sisi administration is relying upon to stimulate growth. But the 
flow of direct investment is as uncertain as the development approach itself is ques-
tionable. With economic stagnation and an ensuing deterioration of living conditions 
foreseeable, protests are liable to flare up again. Germany and the European Union 
should prepare for further destabilisation in the Arab world’s most populous nation. 
 
Cairo hopes that the Egypt Economic Devel-
opment Conference will produce a massive 
influx of foreign capital. In recent months 
the regime has issued a steady stream 
of positive economic news, asserting that 
accelerating growth, falling unemployment 
and rising foreign direct investment demon-
strate the efficacy of its economic course. 
The leadership around President Abdel 
Fatah al-Sisi received backing from the Inter-
national Monetary Fund, whose February 
2015 Staff Report notes a series of concerns 
but concludes that the regime’s economic 
reforms are initiating a turnaround. 
How Bad Have Things Got? 
These positive claims obscure the true extent 
of Egypt’s economic crisis, and above all the 
consequences for its population of 87 mil-
lion. In fact economic growth more or less 
stopped during the political upheaval of 
2011 and has barely recovered since. Be-
tween 2011 and 2013 annual GDP growth 
struggled to keep pace with population 
growth. For the current fiscal year ending 
in June, Cairo has announced GDP will rise 
by more than 4 percent – but that puts per 
capita growth at about 2 percent and as 
such only slightly higher than the figures 
for highly developed industrial economies. 
This is nowhere near enough to absorb the 
annual influx of up to 800,000 young people 
entering the Egyptian labour market. That, 
it is estimated, would require annual 
growth of at least 6 or 7 percent. And even 
higher long-term growth rates would be 
required to bring down the high rate of un-
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employment, which is currently estimated 
at almost 40 percent among young people 
(aged 15–24). 
Unemployment, low-quality jobs and 
ongoing inflation in combination have led 
to a dramatic increase in poverty. In the 
2012–13 fiscal year the national poverty 
rate (in relation to a poverty line of slightly 
less than €40/month) exceeded 26 percent, 
having increased by almost five percentage 
points within only four years. Here again, 
young Egyptians are affected particularly 
badly: in 2013–14 the official statistical 
agency put the proportion of young people 
living below or only just above the poverty 
line at almost 52 percent. These figures are 
all the more alarming if one considers the 
state’s lack of resources to increase social 
spending. 
With the economic crisis comes a budget 
squeeze whose end – contrary to govern-
ment predictions. – is nowhere in sight. 
State debt has risen by more than 11 per-
cent since 2011 to hit an estimated 94 
percent of GDP (2014). And the budget 
deficit has stayed in double figures, peaking 
at an estimated 13.7 percent in the 2012–13 
budget year. A further rise has only been 
averted by at least $23 billion worth of aid, 
loans and oil shipments from Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. With-
out that assistance from the Gulf, Egypt 
would already have gone bankrupt. Cairo 
has announced its intention to reduce its 
budget deficit to 10 percent in the present 
budget year by means of tax increases and 
massive cuts in energy subsidies. But while 
subsidies on fuel and electricity were in-
deed scaled back in summer 2014 – leading 
to price increases of up to 70 percent – the 
move made conspicuously little impact on 
the budget figures released in March. The 
opacity of the state budget makes it virtu-
ally impossible to forecast the medium- and 
long-term effect of such measures. The IMF 
expects further cuts in subsidies to follow, 
but given the foreseeable unpopularity of 
such a move it is by no means certain. 
State Mega-Projects on 
Empty Coffers 
Despite his empty treasury, Sisi is relying 
on gigantic development projects to revive 
the economy. Alongside one million homes, 
multiple energy ventures (including Egypt’s 
first nuclear reactor), and several large-scale 
regional development projects (such as 
building a new seat of government near 
Cairo), the Suez Canal expansion is the cen-
trepiece of state planning. The construction 
of the New Suez Canal permitting vessels 
to pass in both directions simultaneously is 
scheduled for completion by August 2015. 
While the Sisi regime celebrates the project 
as a blow for the national cause, question 
marks over its cost-benefit calculations 
recur in similar form in other mega-projects 
still in the planning phase. The govern-
ment’s forecast of traffic doubling and 
revenues rising by about 150 percent by 
2023 is not credible. For the number of 
vessels passing through depends on numer-
ous other factors apart from the capacity 
of the channel, not least global economic 
trends. It is also questionable whether con-
struction of the second channel will actually 
generate sustainable trickle-down effects. 
The project is extremely labour-intensive – 
but only during the construction phase. 
And even there the employment effects are 
unclear, because the military will contrib-
ute its own personnel in the construction 
process. But the central problem is the 
immense cost of construction, probably far 
exceeding $8 billion. Rather than tapping 
external funding such as loans from inter-
national donor organisations, which would 
probably have offered much more favour-
able conditions but demanded considerably 
greater transparency, the government is 
relying on purely domestic financing. Repay-
ment of principal and interest on the invest-
ment certificates, which supposedly pre-
serve the national character of the venture, 
will burden the state budget with liabilities 
of up to $13 billion over the coming five 
years. Issuance of the certificates is also 
likely to exacerbate the credit squeeze in 
the Egyptian banking sector, because a not 
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inconsiderable proportion (probably more 
than 40 percent) have been bought using 
existing deposits, thus withdrawing liquid-
ity from the banks. Application of this fund-
ing model to other development projects is 
therefore highly unrealistic. 
Direct Investment as Solution? 
To fund further mega-projects the Sisi 
administration is therefore relying instead 
on foreign capital. At the investment con-
ference in March it intends to invite foreign 
businesses to participate financially in about 
thirty major development projects. More 
broadly, the government also hopes to en-
hance the country’s fundamentally attrac-
tiveness for foreign investors, principally 
through a new investment law designed to 
accelerate administrative procedures and 
strengthen legal certainty. But legislative 
reforms alone will not solve Egypt’s struc-
tural economic problems, such as the very 
low quality of education, weak innovation 
capacity and labour market inefficiency. 
Moreover, the government does nothing to 
eliminate endemic corruption and state 
mismanagement. That would demand first 
and foremost a comprehensive and trans-
parent pursuit of Mubarak-era corruption 
cases. In fact, many of these lawsuits have 
instead been dropped in recent months or 
ended in opaque settlements. Legal changes 
instituted in 2014 place enormous obstacles 
in the way of challenging contracts between 
state agencies and investors and will make 
it almost impossible for NGOs to fight state 
corruption. 
Altogether the current efforts of the Sisi 
administration to attract foreign direct 
investment are strongly reminiscent of the 
latter years of the Mubarak era. Between 
2004 and 2007 Egypt was able to increase 
the inflow of foreign capital almost tenfold 
through partial reform of the legal frame-
work, tax incentives and the distribution 
of cheap building land. Net inward invest-
ment in 2007 was almost 9 percent of GDP 
(almost four times the 2013 figure), and in 
response economic growth rose to more 
than 7 percent. The World Bank’s Doing 
Business Report even praised Egypt as “top 
reformer in 2006/07”. However, the invest-
ment boom had no positive effects on gen-
eral living conditions. On the contrary, the 
national poverty rate jumped two percent-
age points between 2005 and 2008 alone. 
Criticism of the new investment strategy 
is therefore also heard from Egyptian civil 
society circles. In a study published in Feb-
ruary 2015, the Egyptian Centre for Eco-
nomic and Social Rights states that treating 
the flow of direct investment as a goal in 
itself rather than as a means to combat 
poverty, unemployment and underdevelop-
ment means that the country attracts only 
investments that pay quick returns but 
create little in the way of sustainable em-
ployment. Examples it names include the 
construction of shopping malls and hous-
ing for Egypt’s elites by firms from the Gulf 
states, as well as direct investment in the 
Egyptian gas and oil sector. Such projects, 
it says, contribute little to industrialisation 
or to knowledge and technology transfer. 
Besides that, these legislative amend-
ments are of only secondary importance 
for the decisions of longer-term investors, 
for whom the general state of the Egyptian 
judiciary is likely to carry greater weight. 
In recent months Egyptian courts have 
attracted attention primarily for overtly 
political mass death sentences with no 
pretence of observing due process, raising 
doubts about the legal wisdom of investing 
in Egypt. But most of all the current secu-
rity situation is likely to influence invest-
ment decisions. Politically motivated vio-
lence has increased since the military took 
power, with almost daily attacks on secu-
rity forces, energy and transport infrastruc-
ture, and increasingly also foreign com-
panies, which are accused of supporting 
the regime. 
Conclusion: No Stabilisation in Sight 
At best the upcoming investment confer-
ence might generate short-term growth 
stimuli. But it will not initiate any sustain-
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able economic transformation. The Sisi 
administration’s growth strategy leaves 
too many structural problems untouched, 
including rampant corruption, nepotism 
and legal uncertainty. Any trickle-down 
effects will be small, and dissatisfaction 
will grow in large parts of the population. 
To preserve its power the regime will have to 
step up repression, with further negative 
repercussions on economic development. 
The probability of a progressive destabili-
sation of the most populous state on the 
Mediterranean is thus high. 
Germany and the European Union 
should therefore refrain from supporting 
the development strategy of the Sisi ad-
ministration until it undertakes recognis-
able steps to improve governance. The pre-
condition for this is an end to the current 
comprehensive political clampdown on the 
actors that could promote good governance 
– the critical press, civil society and the 
political opposition. Furthermore, excessive 
persecution of the Muslim Brotherhood 
in particular accelerates the radicalisation 
of hitherto moderate actors, as already 
reflected in rising politically motivated 
violence, with dramatic economic conse-
quences too. A reintegration of the Brother-
hood into the political process would there-
fore appear imperative for Egypt’s stabilisa-
tion and economic development. On that 
point, Germany and the European Union 
should also explore the position of the 
new Saudi leadership. Recent weeks have 
seen repeated signs of a cautious shift in 
the Kingdom’s otherwise hostile position 
towards the Brotherhood. As one of Egypt’s 
largest benefactors, Riyadh would be in 
a position to persuade Cairo to adapt its 
strategy. 
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